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ABSTRACT 
 
The present study was aimed to investigate the effect of financial distress on investment 
efficiency with the moderating role of managerial and institutional ownership of companies 
listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange. For current study, proportional allocation sampling 
technique is used under which 94 companies were selected as a sample for the study period of 
2011-2015. To test the hypotheses, multiple regression was used in which this study has used 
fixed and random effect model. The Findings of the current study indicates that financial distress 
negatively effects the investment efficiency of the companies listed on Pakistan stock exchange, 
moreover the moderating role of institutional ownership increase the effect of financial distress 
on investment efficiency, whereas the moderating role of managerial ownership decrease effect 
of financial distress on investment efficiency. Hence, shareholders and investors should consider 
this issue and they should investigate the financial distress position and the degree of managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership at the time of investment in companies.  
 
Key words: Financial Distress, Investment Efficiency, Institutional Ownership, Managerial 
Ownership   
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I. INTRODUCATION 
 
1.1  Background of the Study  
Investment in different activities by companies has been considered reliable as one of the 
important methods of developing companies and avoiding bankruptcy. In this field, limitations in 
resources have triggered that in addition to investment development, increase in investment 
efficiency also appears to be necessary. In general investment efficiency means accepting 
projects with a positive net present value and by investment inefficiency, it means the selection 
of project with a negative net present value.  
There are two theoretical criteria to determine the investment efficiency, the first criteria for 
the financing investment opportunities is determined by the collection of resources, each 
investment project is financed in the efficient market which has a positive net present value.  
Instead of this many research studies on financial areas shows that the financial limitation can 
bound the managers’ capabilities to finance (Hubbard, 2001). The companies facing with 
financial limitation might discard those projects which have positive net present value because of 
high cost of financing. And in return due to low investment, this issue is raised. The second 
criteria show that if a firm chooses to finance, there is no agreement that investment will be 
properly directed. (i.e. managers may lead inefficient investment by choosing unsuitable project 
for the purposes of their own benefits or mismanagement of the resources. In addition, each firm 
when seeks a business project, they purchase the assets required for the implementation of that 
project and for acquiring these assets the financing can be acquired through different approaches 
such as common stock or other various ways of borrowings. When after launch of this project it 
can be successfully executed in this situation as because the interest on debts can be paid timely, 
the repayment of principal and shareholders are also can be paid according to the expected return 
from the investment. In contrast when the project seems to be failed, the output cash flow 
exceeds the input cash inflow and the firm faces the second situation in which it cannot provide 
enough cash for supporting its own continuous requirements, and hence can face financial 
distress. In this situation the firms tend to sell assets and can get loans, which in return outcomes 
Journal of Management Research (JMR)                                                                                                 
Vol 4, Issue 1, Jan-June 2018                                                                                                                        
P-ISSN # 2523-2118, E-ISSN # 2617-036190 
 
108 
 
in the decrease in capacity and creative efficiency as well as increase in leverage ratio. 
Moreover, the capital market participants need information of financial position and their 
efficiency of existing companies. One of the technique by which the proper usage of investment 
opportunities and better distribution of assets is to forecast bankruptcy or financial distress of 
firms. Inspite of that first by offering the essential attentions, firms can be aware of the incidence 
of bankruptcy to predict essential measures and secondly creditors and investors can differentiate 
between suitable and unsuitable investment opportunities as well as invest their resources in 
proper investment opportunities (Bahramfar & Mehrani, 2004).   
Gordon (1971) presented a theory of financial distress, according to this theory it indicates 
that the reduction in the power of profitability which increases the possibility of incapability to 
pay interest on debt and original debts. Whitaker (1999) identify the financial distress as 
situation in which company’s cash flow are less than the total cost of the interests relates to long 
term debt. In the sense of economics financial distress as inferred is unprofitability of companies. 
In this situation company’s faces problem of failures in which company’s rate of returns is less 
than rate of capital costs.  (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001) states that the situation of company’s 
financial distress is the low financial return stage, inappropriate management leads to a decrease 
in annual investment returns. (Zhang & Gan, 2010)  conclude that the nature of a company’s 
controlling shareholder significantly influences the firm financial distress cost. Managerial 
ownerships are measured as an important method for reducing agency conflict however 
sometimes it become cause for agency conflict. The association between shareholder and 
manager create agency problem (Hassan and Butt, 2009). The company’s manager role is 
shareholder wealth maximization but when these managers has does not substantial ownerships 
in a firm, the manger may be get incentive to make decision which does not in favors of minority 
shareholder therefore as a result create agency conflict (Cornett et.al., 2010). Moreover, another 
cause of lack of investment inefficiency and financial distress is due to ownership type, as the 
mangers usually invests in inappropriate projects for purpose to achieve their personal benefits 
(Alifiah et al., 2013). (Sun, 2014) explain that the ownership type has contributes to firms’ 
investment efficiency of the companies. Compositions of ownerships structure are differing from 
companies to companies. Owner of the companies can be family, managerial, individual, 
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institutional, foreign and government company’s etc. But in this study, using two types of 
ownerships structure. These types are managerial ownerships and institutional ownerships. 
 So, In the present study, the role of ownership type is also considered as a moderator 
variable to investigate that weather ownership type has effective moderating role on financial 
crisis and investment efficiency and either it leads to improve or weaken this effect. Moreover a 
few number of research studies have been directed on the above issue; however, nobody has 
been research on the effect of financial distress on investment efficiency. In this way, 
anticipating financial distress and investment efficiency of organizations has dependably been 
one of the issues considered by creditors, investors and governments.  
1.2  Objective of Study  
The essential goal of the study is to investigate the effect of financial distress on 
investment efficiency companies listed on Pakistan stock exchange. Following are the objectives 
of the current study 
 
 To investigate the effect of financial distress on investment efficiency of the   companies 
listed on Pakistan stock exchange.  
 To examine the moderating effect of Institutional ownership on financial distress and 
investment efficiency of the companies listed on Pakistan stock exchange. 
 To examine the moderating effect of Managerial ownership on financial distress and 
investment efficiency of the companies listed on Pakistan stock exchange. 
 
1.3   Hypotheses  
 For the purpose to achieve the objectives, the following hypothesis are  developed. 
H0: There is an insignificant effect of financial distress on investment efficiency of 
companies listed on Pakistan stock exchange. 
H1:  There is a significant effect of financial distress on investment efficiency of companies 
listed on Pakistan stock exchange.  
H0:  Institutional ownership has no significant moderating effect on financial distress and 
investment efficiency of companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange.  
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H2:  Institutional ownership has a significant moderating effect on financial distress and 
investment efficiency of companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange.  
H0:  Managerial ownership has no significant moderating effect on financial distress and 
investment efficiency of companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange. 
H3:  Managerial ownership has a significant moderating effect on financial distress and 
investment efficiency of companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange. 
1.4    Significant of the Study  
Investment efficiency is a critical part of a firm and most importantly it is the main center 
of focus for all the companies’ shareholders as they are interested in high return from the 
managers, to achieve this, the current study is helpful for both the managers as well as 
shareholders as the managers can investigate the cause of bankruptcy in their company and can 
take strong measures regarding the investment inefficiency and can provide better return to the 
shareholders of the company. Since from the past several years Pakistani economy has been 
greatly affected by financial distress, so the current study can help the economists to avoid these 
financial distresses and hence can benefit the Pakistani economy also. Moreover, this study also 
provides information and guideline regarding ownership types in Pakistan i-e managerial and 
institutional ownership, which also play an important role in investment efficiency and financial 
distress. Furthermore, this study can also offer a new outlook for investors regarding their 
investment decisions from the empirical results of the current study. The findings are also fruitful 
for the company’s managers to secure the companies from the bankruptcy.  Also, this study is 
beneficial for creditors, investors and government, as they would be able to take right decisions 
in investment. Most importantly the current study also adds value to literature about financial 
distress and investment efficiency of companies.  
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The occurrence of finical distress and the necessity of coping with its negative 
consequences as well as the use of opportunities resulting from it are necessities which economic 
officials pay attention to. This phenomena results to economic recession in a part of global 
economy and in a short period of time covered the all over community of global economy and 
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stopped wheels of economies as well as companies. The agency problems generally result from 
over investments via manager interest personal benefit and misused used of free cash flows with 
negative net presents value project (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Various other studies on 
ownership structure like Kim and Sorensen (1986) obtained positive relationship between level 
of debt and managerial ownerships in capital structure.  But (Holdness and Sheehan, 1988) 
showed the opposite of above results. They observed inverse relationship of the level of debt and 
managerial shareholdings in capital structure. Specifically, those managers who are more likely 
avoids used of high levels of debts as compared to equity. 
As an essential path of company worth conception, investment is extremely subject to 
information’s asymmetry and agency problem. Generally, information’s asymmetry considered 
increases to market conflict and uses effects on the cost of externals financing simply, leading to 
inadequate investments for companies under liquidity constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988).  Cleary 
(1999) directed a study to observe the association between investment and financial position of a 
company’s by using model of regression on the availability of data for 1317 U.S companies 
during 1987 to 1994. The study concluded that the levels of sensitivity related to availability of 
inside fund is high for higher creditworthy companies as compared to low creditworthy firms and 
financially distress company’s investment decision are more sensitive to liquidity than less 
financial distress companies. Also (Hall, 1992) examines the factor of UK companies bankruptcy 
and argue that inefficient marketing is clearly the basic reason of companies bankruptcy. A 
further interesting results were obtained which indicates that there was no effect of managerial 
ownership and levels of debts on capital structure of the firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
(Thornhill & Amit, 2003) analyzed the data of 339 Canadian companies (Bankrupted) to identify 
the effect of bankruptcy between the older and younger companies. The researcher used Altman 
model for the purpose to predict the bankruptcy among younger firms and older companies. In 
this study the researcher fund that lack of financial management ability and managerial skills 
have the main reasons behind the bankruptcy of younger companies, while the main cause of 
bankruptcy in older Canadian companies have the lack of ability to adapt environmental change. 
And ((Lipinga, Yub, & Gongmengc, 2006) indicates that institutional investor who are externals 
shareholder have a negative relationships with their financial performance of companies’. Odit 
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and Chittoo (2008) investigate the impact of financial leverage on investment decision of 
companies. In this study tried to investigate the impact of financial leverage on investment level 
by using firms-level panel data over a period of 1990 to 2004. The results reveal there is negative 
and significant impact of financial leverage on investment.  
(Ali Shah, Butt, & Hassan, 2009) directed an investigation titled "corporative governance 
and earnings management in Pakistani listed company". Through utilizing Jones`s balanced 
model they computed unrestricted associations and by testing the assumptions through lapse 
strategy presumed that the nature of corporative governance has a positive association with 
earnings management. One of the reasons of this outcome is the disclosure of corporative 
governance strategies that are displayed by the company. (Khajavi, Bayazidi, & Jabbarzadeh, 
2012) in their study i-e "relative examination of the nature of financial revealing of distressed 
and non-distressed organizations listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange, argue that the nature of 
financial announcing in the non-distressed organizations appreciate less manageability than 
distressed organizations do. (Liu, 2012) observed that shareholder’s ratios of institutional 
investors when the shareholders ratio of institutional investor is over eight percent was found 
negative relationship with company financial performance and if not, over eight percent was 
found a positive relationship with company financial performance.  
To highlight a relationship of ownership structure with investment efficiency and 
financial distress (Rabeea, 2014) used 170 non-financial firms of Pakistan to establish a 
relationship among institutional ownership, leverage and financial distress by applying 3SLS 
method to remove simultaneous bias. In this study four control variables for leverage are used 
namely profitability, size of firm, sales growth and tangibility. Results suggest that size of firm 
has positive role in determining the level of firm’s leverage which means big firms are more 
leveraged. Profitability is found to have inverse relationship with leverage as profitable firms 
have enough internally generated funds. In this study sales growth and tangibility was found 
insignificant with leverage. (Vo & Nguyen, 2014) suggested a positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and leverage. Firms with high leverage level are exposed to high risk. 
Therefore, managers do not prefer debt to avoid risk associated with it. Excessive use of debt 
increases the risk of bankruptcy and reduces the value of firm. (de la Cruz, Lizano, & Madrid, 
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2014) examined the impact of corporate governance on the precision of model of anticipating 
financial crisis in Spain for the financial periods from 2007-2012. The results showed that a 
portion of the systems of corporate governance enhance the force of anticipating models of 
financial distress. (R. Chen, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Wang, 2014) observe the relationships 
between ownerships type and firm level capital investments sensitivities to stock prices and 
determine that ownerships type was import ant’s role to determine company’s investment 
efficiency. (Heidarpoor & Habibipour, 2015) in an investigation attempted to forecast earnings 
management through nerve framework and choice tree in corporations of accepted in Tehran 
Stock Exchange. Earnings management in contrast with straight strategies and have bring down 
error level. Moreover, earnings management have the most relations with obligatory and not 
obligatory collection factors of the past period and company`s execution and the rate of earnings 
consistency in both techniques. Roomi et al. (2015) also conducted a study on prediction of 
bankruptcy for Non-Financial Companies in Pakistan. The researcher used 2 models for the 
determining the financial position of non- financial companies and the sampling method was 
convenience sampling techniques and select 50 companies as a sample. The outcomes explained 
that Altman’s Z-Score and Abbas model models have effective tools for investigating the 
financially health positions of non- financial companies listed at KSE.  The authors further 
explore that low-level capital companies have been more financial distress firms as considered to 
highly capital in non- financial companies listed in Pakistan. (Hu & Zheng, 2015) investigated 
the impact of the structure of ownership on the level of financial crisis in China on 387 
organizations for a financial period from 2000 to 20008. The outcome showed that the 
concentration of ownership negative affects the level of financial crisis in organizations. Raei et 
al., (2016) conducted a research about investigated financial distress of firms. In this study the 
researcher investigates the financial distress firm and the sample size was 40 bankrupt firms 
during the year 1993-2000 and outcome of result was found 95.3 percent companies were fund 
bankrupt by using Altman model.  (Wu & Wang, 2016) studies about institutional ownerships 
mispricing and company’s investments. And the results assume that institutional ownerships that 
institutional investors increase the investment mispricing links mean that institutional investors 
tend to be short termism and lead to investment inefficiencies. (Wei et al., 2016) argue that 
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ownership type has significant relationship with company’s financial distress and stated that 
managerial ownership has positive relationship with financial distress of companies. 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
 
The current study has taken only the non-financial sector from Pakistan stock exchange 
for the population of study. There is a total of 384 companies in non-financial sector so, by using 
proportional allocation method for sampling purpose and certain conditions were applied for 
purpose to exclude those firms from our analysis for which complete data was not available for 
the stated period. Hence after applying the conditions followed from (Vosoughi et al., 2016) this 
study found a final sample of 94 firms for period 2011- 2015 which is the actual sample of the 
current study. The data were collected from different sources like PSX (Pakistan stock 
exchange), Bureau of statistics, SBP (State bank of Pakistan) and financial reports of the 
companies’ which are listed in Pakistan stock exchange and are download from their respective 
websites and institutional, managerial ownership data are collect from annual report of the 
concern companies 
Following are the conditions 
1.  The company should have been listed in the Pakistan Stock Exchange from 2010. 
2.  for purpose to comparability the financial periods should be at the end of June.  
3.  It should not be banks and financial institute (financial intermediation, investment 
 companies, leasing and holding companies).  
4.  During the research investigating year the company should not have trading’s 
 interruption for more than 3 months. 
5.  The company should not have change in activity or their fiscal year during the year 
mention 
6.  Information’s required for calculating research variable and explanatory note 
 relating to them should be available in the year mention 2011 to 2015. 
3.1     Independent Variables 
3.1.1 Financial Distress 
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Financial distress is state where firms are not capable to repay their debts and their 
liability surpass on existence assets, thus the firm’s defaults. Altman (1968) was consider as the 
pioneer who began work on financial distressed. Altman formed a model to anticipate financial 
distressed of firms. The model called Z score model and it is the percentage of five-financial 
ratio. After many financial ratios, these ratios were chosen for anticipating the financial distress 
position of companies. Ratio is computed from retained earnings, total assets, sales, and total 
liabilities, earnings before interest and taxes and market value of firm. Following ratio is below 
given. 
This model constructed from five financial ratios as follows. 
                                    
Where  
   is Working Capital to Total Assets. 
   is Retained Earnings to Total Assets 
   is Earnings Before Interest and Taxes to Total Assets. 
   is the Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Debts? 
   is Sales to Total Assets.  
 
 
3.2      Dependent variable 
3.2.1   Investment Efficiency 
Investment efficiency is the function of the risk, returns and total cost of an investment 
management structure, subject to the fiducially and other constraint within which investor must 
operate (Hodgson, Breban, Ford, Streatfield, & Urwin, 2000). So, in this current study 
(Richardson, 2006; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Chen et al., 2011; Biddle et al., 2009) is follow for 
calculating investment efficiency (too high and low investment) for companies listed in the 
Pakistan Stock Exchange. We specifically regress investment on revenue growth and use the 
residuals as a firm-specific proxy for differences from expected investment. Positive (negative) 
regression residuals from the regression model are used as a proxy for over (under)-investment. 
Hence, firms with residuals at or near zero reflect greater investment efficiency. 
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 Where               is calculated as the sum of a company’s new investment in Land 
Machinery, Vehicles, Building, Equipment, less Depreciation and Amortization and sales of Net 
property plant and equipment at year t. Total investment in each year is divided by Total Asset 
and              is a firm’s sales growth at year t-1, calculated as the difference between 
sales in year t and sales in year t-1,scaled by sales in year t-1.   
3.3       Control variables  
Selecting control variables ROA (Return of Assets), Leverage, MBV (Market to Book 
value) and firm size were based on the previous studies of researchers such as Richardson 
(2006), (Biddle, Hilary, & Verdi, 2009),  (Das & Pandit, 2010), (F. Chen, Hope, Li, & Wang, 
2011),  and (Cheng, Dhaliwal, & Zhang, 2013). 
3.4      Model of the Study 
Multiple regression model was used for investigating the effect financial distressed on 
investment efficiency of the companies listed in Pakistan stock exchange.  
 To check the first hypothesis, the following model was used.   
                                                                  …(3.1)  
Where           is investment efficiency,   is intercept, β is coefficient of constant,      is 
financial distress,        is return on assets,        is market to book value and         is firm 
size. For purpose to check the moderating role of institutional ownership and Managerial 
ownerships effect of financial distress on investment efficiency of the companies listed in 
Pakistan stock exchange the following model were used for both institutional ownership and 
managerial ownership respectively. 
 
                             (       )                              
               ……(3.2) 
          
                   (       )                                                                   
                     ........(3.3) 
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In equation 2 and 3 the interactions effect between IO (institutional ownerships) and MO 
(Managerial ownerships) with Z determines the moderation effects. Normally, if there are no 
significant relationships on the dependent variable (investment efficiency) from the interactions 
between the moderator and independent variable (financial distress) the moderation is not carried 
(Vosoughi et al., 2016). For analysis of panel data, the current study is used three type of 
regression models and these models are pooled OLS, random effect models and fixed effect 
model.  
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1     Descriptive Statistics  
 The descriptive statistics table shows the value of standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum and mean of 470 observations of a data set for a sample of 94 firms for the period of 5 
years. The descriptive statistics table indicates that there is a reasonable difference between the 
minimum and maximum values of all the variables.   
Table 4.1   Descriptive Statistics  
VARIABLE Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev Observation 
INVEST_EFFI 0.09 1337.3 -546.46 79.42 470 
Z_SCORE 2.61 8.31 -2.36 1.58 470 
I_O 27.14 90.27 0 26.59 470 
M_O 29.32 92.89 0 28.44 470 
ROA 0.03 0.43 -0.52 0.08 470 
LEV 0.63 2.2 0.08 0.31 470 
SIZE 18.77 24.62 11.26 3.2 470 
M_B 9.33 93.36 0.03 17.18 470 
4.2     Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroscedasticity 
In the regression heteroscedasticity are detected by Breusch-Pagan test. The test results of 
all three models showed that the p-values of chi-square is higher than 0.05 hence the null 
hypothesis is accepted which is there are existing homoscedasticity. The results of Breusch-
Pagan test for all the three models are shown in the table 4.2 
Table 4.2 Results 0f Breush-Pagan for Heteroscedasticity 
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Hypothesis 
Chi-
square 
P-
Value 
Decision 
Model 1  H0: variance is homoscedastic 2.69 0.1 variance is homoscedastic 
H1: variance is heteroskedastic 
Model 2  H0: variance is homoscedastic 0.44 0.5 variance is homoscedastic 
H1: variance is heteroskedastic 
Model 3  H0: variance is homoscedastic 0.12 0.72 variance is homoscedastic 
H1: variance is heteroskedastic 
 
4.3     Multicollinearity 
In regression multicollinearity is detected by Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The results 
show that variance inflation factor of all the explanatory variable is lower than 10.  It means that 
explanatory variable is not correlated and faces no problem of multicollinearity. The results are 
shown in the table 4.3 
Table 4.3 Test of Multicollinearity  
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF 
Financial Distress 3.23 Financial Distress 5.81 Financial Distress 3.70 
ROA 2.30 Institutional ownership  4.66 Managerial Ownership 4.30 
Leverage 2.35 I.O*Z Score 6.39 M.O*Z Score 4.56 
MBV 1.13 ROA 2.42 ROA 2.46 
Size 1.06 Leverage 2.32 Leverage 2.31 
  Market to Book Value 1.67 Market to Book Value 1.71 
  Size 1.49 Size 1.66 
 
 
 
4.4  Model Identification Test for Panel Data   
Table 4.4  Model Identification Test for Panel Data   
Model Chow Test Brush-Pegan LM 
Test 
Hausman Test Decision 
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Model 1 F= 1.45 
P-Value= 0.007 
χ2 = 2.69 
P-value= 0.100 
χ2 = 14.64 
P-value = 0.011 
Fixed effect is suitable 
Model 2 F= 1.25 
P-Value= 0.007 
χ2 = 0.44 
P-value= 0.05 
χ2 = 13.32 
P-value = 0.06 
Random effect is suitable 
 
Model 3 F= 1.21 
P-Value= 0.01 
χ2 = 0.12 
P-value= 0.72 
χ2 = 14.45 
P-value = 0.04 
Fixed effect is suitable 
 
Model 1 investigating the effect of financial distress on investment Efficiency. 
Table 4.5 represents the results of financial distress on investment efficiency. The 
findings show that there is a significant and negative effect of financial distress on investment 
efficiency. The regression coefficient value is i.e -17.09 with a p-value of 0.01 which is less than 
(0.05) and is significant to 5% level of significance. The existence of negative effect of financial 
distress on investment efficiency indicated that investment efficiency increases with the decrease 
in financial distress and if financial distress change by 1-unit then investment efficiency change 
by 17.09 units negatively. The results indicate that financial distress has negative effect on 
investment efficiency, it means that when the company suffers from financial distress, the 
investment efficiency is high. Hence the firm managers seem the financial distress as a substitute 
for investment efficiency. These results are consistent with those of (Biddle et al., 2009) and 
(Das and Pandit, 2010).  
The results of control variables i-e ROA show a negative and significant effect on 
investment efficiency because the p-value is 0.008 which is less than the 5% significance level. 
The value of coefficient of ROA is -147.16 which shows that there exist an inverse effect of 
ROA on investment efficiency. The presence of negative effect of ROA on investment efficiency 
hold up the hypothesis based on literature which states that firms with negative ROA increase the 
financial distress position of the firms (Vosoughi., et al 2016). The results of variable i-e firm 
size of firm also has negative and significant effect on investment efficiency as the p-value of 
size of firm is 0.02 which is less than 5% level of significance and the value of regression 
coefficient is -36.18 which indicates that there exists an inverse effect of size of the firm on 
investment efficiency. The results of variable i-e Leverage has negative and insignificant effect 
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on investment efficiency because the p-value is 0.94 which is higher than 5% level of 
significance and the value of regression coefficient is -2.66 which indicates that leverage does 
not affect the investment efficiency firms in Pakistan. This outcome is inconsistent with 
(Vosoughi, et al 2016). The results of variable i-e market to book value also has positive and 
insignificant effect on investment efficiency as the p-value of market to book value is 0.98 which 
is greater than the 5% level of  
significance and the value of regression coefficient is 0.009. This outcome is reliable with 
the outcomes of (Vosoughi., et al 2016). 
Results of model 1 also show that overall model is significant. The F-value is 5.007 
having p-value 0.0001 which is less than the 5% level of significance which indicated that the 
whole model is highly significant and the  R square value show that the effect of financial 
distress on investment efficiency, is 0.30 which means that 30 percent variation in investment 
efficiency is due to financial distress and other control variable and other control variable that is, 
ROA, Leverage, Market to book value and size of the firm while the remaining 70 percent of 
variation in investment efficiency is due to many unidentified factors that are not included in the 
model.     
Table 4.5 investigating the effect of financial distress on investment efficiency. 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
T-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 730.90 309.26 2.36 0.01 
Financial Distress -17.09 7.25 -2.35 0.01 
ROA -147.16 84.07 -1.75 0.008 
Leverage -2.66 36.76 -0.07 0.94 
Size -36.18 15.96 -2.26 0.02 
Market to Book Value 0.009 0.53 0.01 0.98 
R- Square 0.300833 F-Value 5.00704 P-value 0.0001 
 
Model 2 Investigating the Effect of Financial Distress on Investment Efficiency; The 
Moderating role of Institutional Ownership    
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The table 4.7 represent the results of the effect of financial distress on investment 
efficiency with moderating role of institutional ownership. The findings show that there is a 
negative and significant effect of financial distress on investment efficiency as the p-value is 
0.0001 and the coefficient value of financial distress is −22.23 which means that financial 
distress change by 1-unit then investment efficiency change by 22.23 units negatively. The effect 
of financial distress on investment efficiency is moderate by institutional ownership because with 
no moderating role of institutional ownership, the coefficient value of financial distress is -17.09. 
While, taken the moderation role of institutional ownership variates the coefficient value of 
financial distress, which is −22.23.  It means that institutional ownership changes the effect of 
financial distress on investment efficiency from 17.09 to 22.23 negatively. The value of 
regression coefficient of institutional ownership * financial distress is positive, i.e. 0.26 with a p-
value of 0.0001 (P < 0.05) which is significant level. The presence of significant moderating 
effect of financial distress on investment efficiency specify that these firm is affect by 
institutional ownership in relation with what decision they make for investment in project at the 
time of financial distress. (Sun, 2014) explain that the ownership type has contributes to firms’ 
investment efficiency of the companies. Institutional shareholders help company raise finance at 
an advantageous. In certain cases, these institutional investors also act as source of debt.  They 
efficiently monitor the strategic decisions of companies and bring down agency costs (Butt and 
Hasan, 2009). 
The results of control variables i-e ROA shows a negative and insignificant effect on 
investment efficiency with the moderating role of institutional ownership because the p-value is 
0.54 which is high than the 5% significance level. The value of coefficient of ROA is -38.04 
which shows that there exists an inverse effect of ROA on investment efficiency with the 
moderating role of institutional ownership. The results of variable i-e size of firm has also 
negative and insignificant effect on investment efficiency with the moderating role of 
institutional ownership as the p-value of firm size is 0.27 which is high than 5% level of 
significance. The regression coefficient value is -1.57 which indicated that there exists an inverse 
effect of size of the firm on investment efficiency.  The results of variables i-e Leverage has 
negative and significant effect on investment efficiency with the moderating role of institutional 
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ownership because the p value is 0.01 which is less than 5% level of significance and the value 
of regression coefficient is -44.57 which indicates that with the moderating role of institutional 
ownership leverage effect on investment efficiency firms in Pakistan and this outcome is 
consistent with (Vosoughi., et al 2016). The results of variables i-e market to book value has 
negative and insignificant effect of market to book value on investment efficiency as the p-value 
is 0.95 which is greater than the 5% level of significance and the value of regression coefficient 
is -0.01. This outcome is reliable with the outcomes of (Vosoughi., et al 2016). 
Table 4.7 Investigating the Effect of Financial Distress on Investment Efficiency; The 
Moderating role of Institutional Ownership   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 130.18 34.41 3.78 0.000 
Financial Distress -22.23 5.63 -3.94 0.000 
Institutional Ownership -1.18 0.29 -3.96 0.000 
I_O*Z_SCORE 0.26 0.09 2.81 0.005 
ROA -38.04 62.73 -0.60 0.54 
LEV -44.57 17.70 -2.51 0.01 
Size  -1.57 1.44 -1.08 0.27 
Market to Book Value -0.01 0.27 -0.05 0.95 
 
Investigating the Effect of Financial Distress on Investment Efficiency; The Moderating 
Role of Managerial Ownership. 
Table 4.9 represents the results of effect of financial distress on investment efficiency 
with moderating role of managerial ownership. The findings show that there is a negative and 
significant effect of financial distress on investment efficiency as the p-value is 0.01 and the 
value of regression coefficient of financial distress is −10.17. The existence of negative effect of 
financial distress on investment efficiency indicated that the investment efficiency increases with 
the decrease in financial distress and if financial distress changes by 1-unit then investment 
efficiency change by 10.17 negatively. The effect of financial distress on investment efficiency is 
moderate by managerial ownership because with no moderating role of managerial ownership, 
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the coefficient value of financial distress is -17.09. While, taken the moderation role of 
managerial ownership variates the coefficient value of financial distress, which is −10.17.  It 
means that managerial ownership changes the effect of financial distress on investment 
efficiency from 17.09 to 10.17 negatively. The value of regression coefficient of managerial 
ownership * financial distress is negative i.e. -0.37 with a p-value of 0.02 (P < 0.05) which is less 
then 5% significant level. The presence of significant moderating effect of managerial ownership 
of financial distress on investment efficiency support the (Zhang and Gan, 2010) argument that 
the nature of a company controlling shareholder significantly influences the firm financial 
distress cost. (Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001) state that the situation of company financial distress is 
the low financial return stage, inappropriate management leads to a decrease in annual 
investment returns. And these results are consistent with Anderson and Reeb, (2003), Vosoughi., 
et al (2016). 
The results of control variables i-e ROA shows a negative and insignificant effect on 
investment efficiency with moderating role of managerial ownership because the p-value is 0.26 
which is high than the 5% significance level. The value of coefficient of ROA is -96.21. The 
results of variables i-e size of firm has also negative and significant effect on investment 
efficiency as the p-value of firm size is 0.02 which is less than 5% level of significance and the 
value of regression coefficient value -37.09 which indicated that there exist an inverse effect of 
size of the firm on investment efficiency. The results of variables i-e Leverage has also negative 
and insignificant effect on investment efficiency because the p-value is 0.26 which is higher than 
5% level of significance and the value of regression coefficient is -22.82 which indicates that 
leverage does not effect on investment efficiency firms in Pakistan with moderating role of 
managerial ownership.  The results of variable i-e market to book value also has negative and 
insignificant effect on investment efficiency as the p-value is 0.96 which is greater than the 5% 
level of significance and the value of regression coefficient is -0.02. This outcome is reliable 
with the outcomes of (Vosoughi., et al 2016). 
Results of model 3 also show that overall model is significant. The F-value is 4.4301 
having p-value 0.0000 which is less than the 5% level of significance which indicates that on the 
whole model is highly significant. The R square value shows that the effect of dependent and 
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independent variable, is 0.31 which means that 31 percent variation in investment efficiency is 
due moderating role of managerial ownership and financial distress and other control variable 
that is, ROA, Leverage, Market to book value and firm size while the remaining 69 percent of 
variation in investment efficiency is due to many unidentified factors that are not included in the 
model.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9 Investigating the Effect of Financial Distress on Investment Efficiency; The 
Moderating role of Managerial Ownership. 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 738.97 303.85 2.39 0.01 
Financial Distress -10.17 7.82 -1.29 0.01 
Managerial Ownership  0.98 0.54 1.80 0.07 
M_O*Z_SCORE -0.37 0.16 -2.29 0.02 
ROA -96.21 86.46 -1.11 0.26 
LEV -22.82 37.57 -0.60 0.54 
Size -37.09 15.90 -2.33 0.02 
Market to Book Value -0.02 0.53 -0.03 0.96 
R-Square 0.311514 F-value 4.4301 P-value 0.0000 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current study addresses agency problems and information asymmetry between 
managers and outside capital providers that may influence capital investment efficiency 
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including both over- and underinvestment (Bushman and Smith 2001; Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 
2009). The overinvestment hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986) suggests that agency problems 
arise from a separation of ownership and control can lead to overutilization of managerial 
discretion, resulting in overinvestment. That is managers attempting to maximize personal 
benefits are inclined to make investments that are not in the best interest of shareholders. The 
underinvestment hypothesis is based on asymmetric information between firms and capital 
market investors when credit rationing creates financial constraints that restrict borrowing 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Managers generally have information that is unavailable to outside 
capital providers about the expected profitability of investment decisions. This information 
asymmetry makes it is difficult for outside capital providers to perfectly observe managers 
investment choices and assess the profitability of the investment opportunities. If outside capital 
providers cannot assess firm’s prospects, then they limit the extent to which managers can pursue 
positive NPV projects through financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment. Taken 
together, the extant literature suggests that agency problems and information asymmetries 
between firms and outside capital providers can lead to investment efficiency. 
By analyzing the effect of financial distress on investment efficiency it was found that the 
effect of financial distress on investment efficiency is negative and significant. The firms focus 
on the investment efficiency as financial distress position decreased. Hence the firm manager 
seemed the financial distress as a substitute for investment efficiency. And other control variable 
like ROA has a negative and significant effect on investment efficiency. The presence of 
negative effect of ROA on investment efficiency hold up the hypothesis based on literature 
emphasizes that firms with negative ROA increase the financial distress position. And size of 
firm has also negative and significant effect on investment efficiency. Leverage has an 
insignificant effect on investment efficiency. It means that leverage does not affect the 
investment efficiency firms in Pakistan.  The result also shows that there is insignificant and 
negative effect of Market to book value on investment efficiency. This study also shows that 
there is significant effect of moderating role of managerial ownership and institutional ownership 
on effect of financial distress on investment efficiency. The presence of significant managerial 
ownership role on effect of financial distress on investment efficiency specify that these firm is 
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affect by managerial ownership in relation with what decision they make for investment in 
project at the time of financial distress. (Sun, 2014) explain that the ownership type has 
contributes to firms’ investment efficiency of the companies. Institutional shareholders help 
company raise finance at an advantageous. In certain cases, these institutional investors also act 
as source of debt.  They efficiently monitor the strategic decisions of companies and bring down 
agency costs (Butt and Hasan, 2009). Zhang and Gan, (2010) argument that the nature of a 
company controlling shareholder significantly influences the firm financial distress cost. 
Sudarsanam and Lai, (2001) state that the situation of company financial distress is the low 
financial return stage, inappropriate management leads to a decrease in annual investment 
returns. These results are consistent with (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and (Vosoughi et al., 
2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
On the basis of findings of the study the following recommendations are made.  
 Financial distress has a negative effect on investment efficiency therefore shareholders 
and investors should consider this issue that they should investigate the financial distress 
position at the time of investment in company.  
 Managerial ownership and insitutional ownership has an effect on financial distress and 
investment efficiency; therefore, creditors should pay attention to the degree of  
managerial ownership and institutional ownership of companies at the time of 
investment. 
 Future researchers can consider more effective variable like family ownership, 
independent directorship and corporate governance as they can produce more interesting 
results. 
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